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Abstract
Cultural prejudice rather than self interest is the conventional wisdom for why voters re-
spond negatively to immigration. Using a new measure of unauthorized immigrants based on
self-reported invalid social security numbers, we show that voters’ responses are more nuanced
than mere prejudice against minorities. Using county level data from the U.S. state of Geor-
gia, we find that voters in counties with above median levels of unauthorized workers are more
likely to support the Republican party. We also find that wealthier counties and wealthier voters
are most likely to respond negatively to the unauthorized. Our evidence warns against argu-
ments that depict opposition to immigration as motivated solely by xenophobia and cultural
fears among lower income whites.
1 INTRODUCTION
Electoral opposition to immigration is mounting, as evidenced by recent elections in Germany,
Austria, Britain, and the United States. While the U.S. is clearly not alone in struggling with
immigration issues, the implication of unauthorized immigration, or those without official legal
documentation, became particularly pertinent in U.S. elections as the population share of unau-
thorized immigrants has grown by over 200 percent over the last 20 years (Krogstad and Passel,
2014). Most recently, Republican President-elect Donald Trump has advocated a policy of mass
deportations, showing the high salience of immigration policy in U.S. elections (Hirschfeld Davis
and Preston, 2016). In addition to election outcomes, an influx of unauthorized immigration has
also led to profound policy changes within U.S. states. Between 1990 and 2012, a majority of U.S.
states have adopted policies directly aimed at restricting unauthorized immigrants’ access to jobs,
education, and social services (NCSL, 2005; Passel, Cohn, Krogstad et al., 2014).
Social science research demonstrates considerable disagreement about why the electorate op-
poses immigration so fiercely. Is opposition to immigration based solely on ethnocentric prejudices
and xenophobia or do voters also worry about competition over economic resources? More specif-
ically concerning the unauthorized, is opposition to unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. thinly
veiled racial prejudice against Hispanics, or alternatively, concerns about school quality, jobs, and
social welfare spending (see for e.g. Borjas, Freeman, and Katz, 1991; Brader, Valentino, and
Suhay, 2008; Campbell, Wong, and Citrin, 2006; Mayda, 2006; Perez, 2010; Scheve and Slaugh-
ter, 2001; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina, 2013)? Recently, scholars have provided evidence that
economic explanations for why people oppose immigration are not as well supported as alterna-
tive explanations based on cultural factors (Card, Dustmann, and Preston, 2012; Hainmueller and
Hangartner, 2013). As a result, racial prejudice and cultural fears are now the dominant expla-
nations for why voters hold anti-immigrant sentiments and vote in elections for anti-immigrant
parties and politicians (see also Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010).
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Despite these findings, there are still many reasons to expect that voters might respond elec-
torally to inflows of unauthorized immigrants based on real or perceived economic threats (Burns
and Gimpel, 2000). Furthermore, while all natives are expected to oppose low skilled immigra-
tion, those natives who have low skills, and by association, lower incomes, might be expected
to oppose immigration the most. Reasons why include arguments that the poor hold more na-
tivist views (Malhotra, Margalit, and Hyunjung Mo, 2013; Margalit, 2012; Sanchez, 1997). The
poor may also have more to lose from immigration, competing for jobs and social services with
incoming unauthorized migrants (Dancygier and Donnelly, 2013; Goldstein and Peters, 2014). Ad-
ditionally, wealthier voters may experience greater social pressures to appear less prejudiced and
more cosmopolitan, tilting evidence in favor of greater prejudice by those with lower incomes as a
consequence of social desirability bias in answering surveys (An, 2015).
On the other hand, scholarship on globalization and inequality suggests that inflows of low
skilled immigrants might activate feelings of redistributive pressures among natives with higher
rather than lower income levels (Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Bearce and Laks Hutnick, 2014;
Hatton and Williamson, 1998). If inflows of unauthorized workers are low skilled, an increase in
low skilled immigration will lead to a rise in income inequality, which can increase pressures for
redistribution and prompt protection of the fiscal purse among the native born (see for e.g. Bearce
and Laks Hutnick, 2014; Borjas, 1987, 1999; Xu, Garand, and Zhu, 2015). Further, an increase in
income inequality is positively associated with increases in political polarization, political mobi-
lization among the wealthy, and the adoption of more conservative tax preferences (Becker, 1983;
Cheung and Cunningham, 2011; Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter, 2007;
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2003; Roemer et al., 1995). As distinct from arguments based on
xenophobia or threat of low-skilled labor substitution, an influx of low skilled immigration might
then be positively associated with anti-immigrant behaviors and sentiments among those natives
with higher rather than lower incomes, as, under a progressive tax system, it is these voters that
have a stake in mobilizing against redistributive policies.
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To date, researchers have largely failed to uncover a strong empirical relationship between
higher incomes and opposition to immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). However if vot-
ers, and especially wealthier voters, are able to successfully mobilize against future redistribution
by supporting tax-conservative political parties today, then the link between immigrants, tax rates,
and expenditures may very well be negated. In fact, preemptive opposition by wealthy voters may
explain why we see a negative (as opposed to positive) correlation in state welfare expenditure and
declining tax rates alongside an increase in the immigrant population (Hainmueller and Hiscox,
2010, Figure 1, p.66). Related, researchers have shown evidence of a strong positive relation-
ship between low skilled immigration and income inequality (Card, 2009) and between income
inequality and political polarization (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2003). As a consequence,
there remain important motivations for why an influx of unauthorized immigrants might spur elec-
toral support for anti-immigrant parties in elections, especially among the wealthy, for economic
reasons.
In order to test this hypothesis, we examine the effect of unauthorized immigrants on Republi-
can vote share in elections over time at the county level in the U.S. state of Georgia. Our primary
contribution is the use of new firm-level data containing self-reported social security numbers in
order to estimate the number of unauthorized immigrants formally employed in a voter’s county
of residence. We do this by assessing whether or not workers in the county report a valid social
security number to their employer. We identify workers as “unauthorized” if they report an invalid
social security number. We then use the average share of unauthorized workers across firms to
proxy the population share of unauthorized immigrants in the county. Importantly, the number of
the unauthorized in a county is distinct from the number of Hispanics (the ethnic group to which
a majority of the unauthorized in the U.S. belong). Thus, our research design can uniquely ac-
count for both the potential influence of a greater population share of Hispanics (cultural threat)
and the potential fiscal threats posed by a greater number of the unauthorized at the same time.1
1The 2008 American Community Survey (ACS) estimates that 11.4 million people in the U.S. were born in Mexico
3
Furthermore, since the unauthorized population is not allowed to vote, we need not worry about
their own voting behaviors. Finally, as the unauthorized (in the U.S.) tend to be low skilled or work
in low skilled occupations, we can be sure to identify those immigrants most likely to contribute to
growing income inequality and that are expected to garner broad opposition by both wealthier and
poorer natives.
Our findings estimate that controlling for the Hispanic population share in a county, a one
percentage point increase in unauthorized immigration corresponds to a 1.6 percent increase in
Republican vote share in the next Congressional election in those counties where there is an above
median share of unauthorized immigrants. We find that wealthy respondents living in areas with a
large population share of unauthorized are most likely to vote for the Republicans in elections, the
political party that is tougher on immigration and supports lower taxes, and this effect is stronger
the higher the county median income. These results are also supported by survey evidence where
we find similar results at the individual level. In all, we find evidence that while ethnic prejudice
against Hispanics is indeed prevalent, economic concerns continue to matter. The key conditions
we find are that the immigrant threat must be present (i.e. the population must be above a certain
population threshold), and opposition to unauthorized immigrants is expressed most strongly by
those living in wealthier areas and among those with higher incomes. Such evidence warns against
arguments that depict opposition to immigration in the U.S. or abroad as motivated solely by
xenophobia and cultural fears among lower income whites.
2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The literature on immigration offers disparate explanations for why we see variation in op-
CPS2008. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimates that 7.03 million unauthorized immigrants from
Mexico were in the U.S. in 2008. From these two sources, we estimate that an upper bound for the percent of
Mexicans (born in Mexico) in the U.S. that is unauthorized is 60 percent. Also see Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker (2012).
Similarly. a 2008 study from the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), which is administered by the Inter-American
Development Bank, estimates that 47 percent of Latin American and Caribbean immigrants living in the United States
are undocumented (cited in Mandelman and Nosal, 2008).
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position to immigration over time and across communities. One strand of the literature focuses
on the types of characteristics that the native born prefer as a result of either ethnocentric atti-
tudes or implicit biases; the literature often calls these factors cultural explanations of opposition
to immigration. According to this view, natives’ opposition to immigrants critically depends on
the personal characteristics of the migrants themselves, with natives holding preferences for cer-
tain types of characteristics over others including: education, religious background, race and or
ethnicity, and country of origin (Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013). Preferences for immigrants
from certain countries of origin or ethnic backgrounds as compared to other countries of origin or
other ethnic backgrounds is termed “prejudice.” A second strand of literature focuses on material
or redistributive threats to the native born that results from competition over economic resources
and or changes to factor payments as a result of influxes of foreign sourced labor. The literature
often refers to this second mechanism as activating “material interests” or economic threats.
In this paper, we focus on examining whether natives’ material interests over fiscal policy are
linked to changes in elections. Fiscal concerns are expected to be associated with higher rather
than lower income areas and earners and so we directly test this. There is mixed evidence on how
(or whether) immigrants affect natives’ wages. Some find that an influx of immigrants leads to
reductions in low skilled wages among the native born (Borjas, 1999) whereas others find little
to no effect (Card, 2009). In the case of Georgia, recent evidence shows that an influx of the
unauthorized marginally increases (rather than decreases) wages among low-skilled, documented
workers (Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli, 2013). Much of this literature, however, focuses on the
direct effects that immigrants have on individual labor outcomes while typically ignoring changes
in income inequality. Importantly, because unauthorized workers occupy the lowest skill level in
the labor market, this allows us to link the population size of the number of unauthorized with
growing income inequality in the state.
In theories of prejudice, the poor are expected to oppose immigration more than the rich. Hain-
mueller and Hiscox (2010), for example, find that while all natives tend to oppose low skilled
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immigration, low skilled, lower income natives are most likely to express opposition to immigra-
tion. There are a number of possible explanations for why. One possible reason is that the poor
may hold more nativist views and experience globalization processes with greater degrees of anx-
ieties and cultural fear (Malhotra, Margalit, and Hyunjung Mo, 2013; Margalit, 2012; Sanchez,
1997); these anxieties may prompt lower income voters to turn against newcomers in elections.
Second, poorer individuals may be more susceptible to manipulation of feelings of prejudice by
political elites and the media, which can encourage ethnocentric behaviors and attitudes (Mendel-
berg, 2001; Newman and Velez, 2014; Valentino, Hutchings, and White, 2002); this would make
lower income counties and individuals most likely to vote for the Republicans. Third, at the indi-
vidual level, those with lower incomes are also expected to be less tolerant of inter-mixing among
races, which is taken as evidence of lower tolerance towards minorities. Tolsma, Lubbers, and
Coenders (2008), for example, find that individuals with lower educational levels are more prone
to oppose inter-ethnic marriage than individuals with higher educational levels; this again would
mean that lower income white counties would be most likely to vote for the Republicans as well
as those with lower incomes. Finally, the percentage of the poor who express cultural fears may
just be higher in surveys. Using a survey, An (2015) finds evidence that wealthier people are more
susceptible to social desirability bias. What this means is that wealthier respondents may be more
attuned to express lower levels of prejudice when answering survey question irrespective of how
much prejudice they may actually feel, tilting evidence of ethnic fears in the direction of the poor.
An additional explanation for why poorer individuals and locales oppose immigration, and in
particular unauthorized immigration, is competition for jobs and wages – labor market competition.
Concerns over job competition or opposition to the unauthorized due to downward pressure on
wages fall under the umbrella of “material interests” as opposed, or in addition to, prejudice.
Some find that an influx of immigrants leads to reductions in low skilled wages among the native
born (Borjas, 1999) whereas others find little to no effect (Card, 2009). There is, however, some
evidence that vulnerable labor market conditions increase anti-immigration sentiment (Muller and
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Espenshade, 1985).
Alternatively, according to theories of fiscal threats, high income natives will oppose low
skilled immigration as it is the higher income individuals that pay a greater share of their income
into a progressive tax system and implicitly do not want to pay more taxes in order to support
low skilled immigrants (Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter, 2007; Mayda,
2006). Scholars have found that Hispanics serve as a good predictor of support for restrictive fiscal
policy (Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Citrin, Green, Muste et al., 1997; Hood III and Morris, 1998;
Valentino, Brader, and Jardina, 2013); that voters are motivated by fiscal concerns when it comes
to advocating English language policies in the classroom (Campbell, Wong, and Citrin, 2006); and
that restricting access to social services is popular in those counties with either a mix of ethnic
groups and counties with above average Hispanic population (Tolbert and Hero, 1996). Similarly,
studies have shown that the wealthy are also most likely to mobilize politically against higher taxes
(Becker, 1983; Cheung and Cunningham, 2011; Roemer et al., 1995); that prospects of upward so-
cial mobility can render individuals far less supportive of redistribution than they otherwise would
be (Benabou and Ok, 2001); and that growing income inequality also increases social pressures
among the middle and upper classes to emulate the tax preferences of the wealthy (Corneo and
Gruner, 2000).
As the unauthorized are primarily low skilled or work in low skilled jobs, an increase in unau-
thorized workers will increase the population share of workers in the lower, left-hand tail of the
skill distribution, increasing income inequality. Further, because the unauthorized are grouped at
the low end of the skill distribution, they are also expected to have a more visible effect on wage
inequality among all workers (Xu, Garand, and Zhu, 2015). Using an across-country sample,
scholars have found that an increase in income inequality is a good predictor of political pres-
sures for redistribution (Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Bearce and Laks Hutnick, 2014; Hatton and
Williamson, 1998). In the U.S., scholars have also shown a positive relationship between income
inequality and widening political polarization, with richer voters gravitating towards the Repub-
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lican party (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2003). Furthermore, the U.S. South is particularly
sensitive to changes in party vote share as a response to changes in income. Gelman, Shor, Ba-
fumi et al. (2007, p.354), find that “... southern states show the strongest relations between county
income and Republican vote share.”
As our argument depends on the link between increases in the population of the unauthorized
and electoral support for the Republicans as a result of increases in inequality, Table A.3 shows the
relationship between state level income inequality in the U.S. state of Georgia and our measure of
the unauthorized from 1990 to 2011. The simple OLS regression analysis examines the effect of
the unauthorized on household income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. To ensure this
correlation is robust, we ran two different models, one controlling for state level GDP and a second
controlling for per person welfare expenditure. As in previous literature, we find a positive rela-
tionship between the population share of the unauthorized and household income inequality. Such
a correlation suggests that natives may indeed perceive increases in redistributive pressures and
feelings of fiscal threat in the presence of the unauthorized. This relationship also corroborates re-
cent findings by Xu, Garand, and Zhu (2015) who find a similar relationship between immigration
and income inequality across all U.S. states.
There are a number of possible criticisms of this argument, however, that also need to be
addressed. First, estimates suggest that immigrants have a net negligible effect on fiscal spending
(estimates put the actual impact as big as 0.5 percent of GDP per year) calling into question how
much “real” threat natives actually feel (Auerbach and Oreopoulos, 1999; OECD, 2013; Tingley,
2013). As a result, it is possible that natives respond to perceptions of fiscal threats rather than
actual fiscal threats. Despite this and as shown above, there is a positive correlation between
inequality and the number of unauthorized which can then be interpreted by natives as pressures
for redistribution. Another critique is that feelings of fiscal burden depends on the native population
responding to real-world changes in demographics, such as changes in the population size. In other
words, in order for voters to feel threatened from immigration, there must be an actual stimulus
8
that creates the feelings of threat in the first place. Citizens may not actually know the size or
numbers of immigrants, or may incorrectly estimate their numbers, which calls into question the
underlying mechanism of competition. Hopkins, Tran, and Williamson (2014), for example, show
that natives cannot correctly estimate the number of immigrants in a geographical area, whereas
other research finds that substantial or drastic changes in the size of immigrant groups over time
does indeed correctly capture local attention (Newman and Velez, 2014). Importantly, even when
local communities cannot correctly estimate actual demographic shifts, mistakes seem to be biased
in such a way as to emphasize rather than de-emphasize group threats from immigration. For
example, in a recent study of 14 countries, researchers find that citizens estimate the actual number
of immigrants as being two-times greater and that the American respondents incorrectly estimated
that 32 percent of the U.S. population are immigrants when the actual immigrant population is
closer to 13 percent on average (MORI, 2014). Finally, immigrants may avoid moving into hostile
areas, reducing the possible in-group and out-group tensions in the first place. Using a cross-
country sample, Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets (2014) show that migrants are less likely to move
into areas that have conservative governments. At the county level, however, we observe significant
variation in the population size of the unauthorized and Republican vote share across counties in
the state of Georgia, suggesting ample variation across the state (see Figure 1).
In summary, scholars have shown that natives are particularly opposed to immigrants, and
while cultural reasons are expected to dominate, economic factors may indeed still matter. In
the next section, we present an empirical design that tries to tease apart the multifaceted ways
in which natives’ electoral behaviors and attitudes towards the unauthorized are associated with
changes in the population share of the unauthorized across counties in the U.S. state of Georgia.
We distinguish between cultural threats, labor market threats, and fiscal threats by accounting
for the unauthorized and Hispanic share of the population simultaneously in the same empirical
model. Evidence of additional threats felt by voters from the presence of unauthorized immigrants,
over and above that by Hispanics, suggests that voters perceive the unauthorized as an additional
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threat to their economic interests. Furthermore, if threat is based only on natavist fears or job
competition, we should see a stronger reaction from poorer counties and voters. If, by contrast,
threat is based also on fiscal concerns, real or perceived, then we should see an independent reaction
from richer counties and voters, as it is the wealthy that bear the greater fiscal burden through the
progressive tax system, and thus the wealthy should have more incentives to mobilize against
expected increases through a higher likelihood of voting for the Republicans. As a preview, our
results provide evidence that wealthier communities react more dramatically to a greater presence
of the unauthorized, and that these threats are independent of and in addition to more prevalent
feelings of threat based on race and ethnic prejudices from the presence of Hispanics.
3 METHODOLOGY
Identifying the Unauthorized
In most research, the unauthorized population is a “hidden” or “hard to reach” community and as
a result, the unauthorized are rarely accounted for. In population based survey data, for example,
the unauthorized are more likely to have higher non-response rates than other survey respondents
and are also less likely to be surveyed in the first place (Chavez, 2012; Cornelius, 1982). Second,
even when the unauthorized are accounted for, they also have incentives to misreport their legal
status and it is difficult for researchers to validate ex post the self reported immigration status of
the respondent. In this paper, we are able to make use of a new measure of the unauthorized
that overcomes these problems and we use this measure to examine how natives’ responses to the
unauthorized varies across different counties and across time.
At best, current estimates of the presence of unauthorized immigrants are available only at the
national or state level (Passel, Cohn, Krogstad et al., 2014; Warren and Warren, 2013), whereas our
measure is able to provide an estimate of the unauthorized at the county level. The data we use to
construct our measure are the Employer File and the Individual Wage File, compiled by the Geor-
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gia Department of Labor for the purposes of administering the state’s Unemployment Insurance
(UI) program. The Employer File provides an almost complete census of firms in Georgia, cover-
ing approximately 99.7 percent of all wage and salary workers (Committee on Ways and Means,
2004). The firm-level information includes the number of employees, and the worker file includes
the worker’s Social Security Number (SSN), from which we determine whether the worker is au-
thorized to legally work or not.2 Our measure captures a unique situation where the unauthorized
have an incentive to report an invalid SSN so as to be able to collect wages they earned through
employment in the formal labor market and that we, as researchers, can determine whether or not
that SSN is a valid or invalid after the fact.
Every quarter, employers file a report with the state Department of Labor detailing all wages
paid to workers who are covered under the Social Security Act of 1935. Each worker on this report
is identified by his/her social security number (SSN). There are several known characteristics of
a valid social security number, and we check whether each number worker’s number conforms to
these characteristics.3 The first three numbers of the SSN are the Area Number. This number is
assigned based on the state where the SSN application was made. The lowest Area Number is
001 and the highest Area Number ever issued, as of December 2006, is 772. Using information
provided by the SSA, we can determine the dates at which area numbers between 691 and 772 are
first assigned. Any SSN with an Area Number equal to 000, greater than 772, or which shows up
before the officially assigned date, is considered invalid. The second piece of a SSN consists of the
two-digit Group Number. The lowest group number is 01, and they are assigned in non-consecutive
order. Any SSN with a Group Number equal to 00 or with a Group Number that appears in the
2Use of these data is restricted and while every state in the U.S. collects these data, we have access to data from the
state of Georgia only. The data are confidential and cannot be directly accessed by any individual not employed by the
Department of Labor, however, arrangements for accessing the data used in this analysis for purposes of replication
can be made with the Director, Office of Research, at the Georgia Department of Labor. Similar data for Connecticut
is used in Couch and Placzek (2010).
3Starting in June 2011, the Social Security Administration began constructing SSNs in a random fashion, so this
identification of whether a SSN is valid or not is no longer possible.
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data out of sequence with the Area Number is considered invalid. The last four digits of a SSN are
referred to as the Serial Number. These are assigned consecutively from 0001 to 9999. Any SSN
with a Serial Number equal to 0000 is invalid.
In 1996 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) introduced the Individual Tax Identification Num-
ber (ITIN) to allow individuals who had income from the U.S. to file a tax return (the first ITIN
was issued in 1997). It is simply a “tax processing number,” and does not authorize an individual to
work in the U.S. Employers are instructed by the IRS to “not accept an ITIN in place of a SSN for
employee identification for work.” An ITIN is only available to resident and nonresident aliens who
are not eligible for U.S. employment and need identification for tax purposes. ITIN numbers have
a “9” in the first digit of the Area Number and a “7” or “8” in the first digit of the Group Number.
Anyone with this numbering scheme we identify as having an invalid Area Number. Interestingly,
the percent of SSNs with high area numbers that also match the ITIN numbering scheme has risen
from about one percent in 1997 to over 60 percent by the end of 2006.
A series of SSNs were de-commissioned by the Social Security Administration because they
had been put on fake Social Security Cards used as props to sell wallets. Apparently, some people
who purchased the wallets thought the fake Social Security Cards were real and started using them
as their own. If any of these 21 “pocketbook” SSNs appear in the data, they are considered invalid,
although their frequency is so low as to be inconsequential. In addition, a number of SSNs are
exactly equal to the employer identification number. These are invalid, primarily because they
have too few digits. In any instance where a SSN is used for more than one person on a firm’s UI
wage report or does not have the required number of digits (including zeros), the SSN is marked
invalid.
The possibility that someone fraudulently uses a valid SSN assigned to someone else poses a
special problem. First of all, the SSN will show up multiple times across firms in one quarter for
workers with different surnames (the wage report includes the first three characters of the workers’
surnames). With this information alone, it is not possible to know which worker is using the SSN
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fraudulently and who the valid owner of the number is. If one of the SSN/surname pairs shows
up in the data initially in a quarter by itself, this is the pair that is considered valid and all other
duplicates (with different surnames) are marked invalid.
This measurement strategy clearly under-counts the actual number of undocumented workers
in Georgia, but we can draw on a couple of sources of external data to show that our sample of
undocumented workers closely represents the presence of unauthorized immigrants in the state of
Georgia and conforms broadly to the patterns in the U.S. as a whole as well. First of all, the rate
of growth seen in both the number and percent of undocumented workers identified in Georgia
matches closely the rate of growth in the Social Security Administrations (SSA) earnings suspense
file (ESF). The ESF is a repository of Social Security taxes paid by employers that cannot be
matched to a valid name or SSN. It is widely believed that this growth in the ESF reflects growing
incidence of unauthorized work in the United States (Bovbjerg, 2006). Figure 2 plots the number
of workers, and the percent of workers, respectively, identified as undocumented along with the
size of the ESF (we plot numbers only through 2006, since that is the last year for which the
ESF data are available). This figure shows a remarkable consistency between the growth seen in
workers identified as undocumented and the ESF. As a second check, we also examine growth
in remittance transactions from the U.S. to Mexico over the same time period and plot this with
growth in the number of unauthorized workers as captured by our measure. As with the ESF
data, Figure 2 shows a similar trend.4 Finally, we also compare our measure against population
based estimates from country of origin. Some estimates are that between 40 and 60 percent of
Mexicans (people born in Mexico) residing in the United States are undocumented, and similarly,
that between 47 and 61 percent of unauthorized immigrants come from Mexico (Hoefer, Rytina,
and Baker, 2012; Mandelman and Nosal, 2008). Clearly not all Hispanics are undocumented, or
vice versa; however, using weighted data from the Current Population Survey (CPS), we calculate
4While we do not have remittance transaction data for the state of Georgia separately, according to a 2008 MIF
survey, approximately 47 percent of undocumented workers send remittances home (MIF, April 2008).
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the average annual growth in total workers and total number of foreign-born, Hispanic workers in
the United States and in Georgia to compare growth rates to those in our sample in order to provide
another validity test for our measure of the presence of unauthorized immigrants in Georgia. These
results are reported in Table 1. The work force in GA grew faster over the period than the U.S.
work force (2.9 vs. 1.5 percent). In addition, the number of foreign-born, Hispanic workers in
the United States grew faster (8 percent per year) than the overall work force; other researchers
have also documented this phenomenon (Passel and Cohn, 2009). But most importantly for our
purposes is that the growth rate of foreign-born, Hispanic workers in Georgia (roughly 27 percent
per year), which is much larger than in the United States overall and is similar to the growth in
the number of workers in Georgia we classify with our measurement strategy. We also observe a
similarly large growth rate in the number of foreign-born, Hispanic workers with less than a high
school degree (21 percent), among which we might expect a larger share of undocumented workers
than among foreign-born, Hispanics in general.
Empirical Model
In this section, we test for whether or not we observe evidence of an economic threat effect given a
larger demographic presence of the unauthorized while controlling for possible cultural concerns.
We also examine whether it is poorer or wealthier counties that react most strongly. So as to
make sure that we are capturing actual behaviors at the individual level, using survey data, we also
explore the impact of a change in the number of unauthorized on natives’ attitudes towards the
unauthorized using social-services.
The statistical analysis is performed at the county level. An increase of support for Republicans
within a county can occur for a number of reasons. First, voters can change their partisan pref-
erence from Democrat to Republican. Second, Democrats can become less likely to vote. Third,
Republicans can become more likely to vote, and finally, Democrats can move out or Republicans
can move into the county. The first three sources of increasing support for Republicans result
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from changes in voting behavior – either voting differently or voting more or voting less. The
fourth source does not result from changing voter behavior and can confound our interpretation;
we specifically address the possibility of this confounding effect in our analysis on in and out
migration in our Robustness Checks.
The dependent variable of interest, election outcomes, measures every vote for Governor, U.S.
Congress, or U.S. Senate at the county level as the share of Republican votes relative to the total
number of votes cast for either the Republicans or the Democrats. We use the proportion of votes as
our main measure, because it captures information about the intensity with which voters prefer the
Republicans over the Democrats or the converse. The election data are obtained from the Georgia
Secretary of State website.5 The analysis in this paper considers Gubernatorial, U.S. Senatorial,
and U.S. Congressional elections by county in the state of Georgia that took place between 1990
and 2010.6
The main explanatory variable is the average share of workers employed by firms that is unau-
thorized. We use this variable as a proxy for the share of unauthorized immigrants in the county.
We also want to account for the fact that some counties are wealthier than others. We therefore,
include median household income obtained from the U.S. Census, Small Area Income and Poverty
Estimates.7 We also control for the racial composition of counties using data from the U.S. Census
Bureau Population Estimates.8
Figure 1 shows the variation in the unauthorized immigration across Georgia counties in 2010.
As we can see, there is significant variation; the median share of unauthorized workers is 0.51
5www.sos.ga.gov/elections
6We report only the Congressional results in the body of the paper but the Senatorial and Gubernatorial results are
included, with other robustness checks, in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
7We match median household income in a given county for an election year. Each variable contains one observation
for each Georgia County for each year between 1989 and 2011, with the exception of the years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994,
and 1996. For observations for each of these five missing years for each county, we impute the missing data and recover
estimates of median household income.
8 http://www.census.gov/popest/data/historical/index.html
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percent across the entire sample and ranges from 0 to 17 percent, with some counties having an
average share of unauthorized workers below the median (those counties with lighter shades),
and some counties with average shares above the median, (those counties with darker shades).
Also shown in Figure 1, we see that while the Republican party dominates across the state in
Congressional elections, there is still large across-county variation in Republican vote share. In
addition, Figure 3 maps the distribution of Median Household Income by county and the population
share that is black. While the correlation between income and population share of blacks is negative
(-0.4), there are counties in Georgia that are predominately white and poor as well as counties in
Georgia that are predominately black and affluent. This is especially true for those affluent black
communities located in the greater Atlanta metropolitan region.
The statistical analysis involves estimating the following logistic regression model via Gener-
alized Linear Methods (see Baum (2008); Maddala (1983)):
ln
RepSharei,j,t
(1−RepSharei,j,t,) = β0 + β1PerUndoci,t−2 + β2PerHispi,t−2 + β
′
3Xi,t
+ β6RepSharei,j−1 + β5RepIncumbi,j + β6EmpGrthi,t + β7NearPerUndoci,t
+ δ1Ej + δ2Ci + i,j,t
RepShare is the share of the vote in county i in election j in year t that accrues to the Republicans.
The coefficients from this estimation are interpreted as the marginal effect of the regressor on the
log-odds ratio of RepShare. However, since our interest is not on the odds of the Republicans
receiving one hundred percent of the vote, which is what the log-odds tells us, we report the
marginal effect of the regressors of interest on a percentage point change in RepShare.9
The regressor of interest, average percent of workers that is unauthorized, has the potential of
9The average marginal effect on Republican vote share from a change in regressor k is calculated as follows:
∂RepShare
∂Xk
= βˆk
e−(βˆΩ)
[1+e−(βˆΩ)]2
, where βˆΩ is the linear prediction for RepShare from the GLM estimation.
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being endogenous to the Republican share of the vote in that county. While the potential for voting
behavior of the population group of interest (unauthorized immigrants) affecting the outcome is
not a concern here, as unauthorized immigrants do not vote, the data are not a panel of individual
voting behavior. Consequently, we only know the share of votes going to Republicans at each
election conditional on the composition of voters in the county during that election. Rather than
a change in voting behavior within a county, out-migration of voters may occur as the result of
the presence of unauthorized immigrants, changing the composition of voters within the county.
Analysis on in- and out-migration described below addresses this specific concern. Additionally,
we lag the regressor of interest, PerUndoc, to help avoid the possibility of reverse causality. We
use a two-year lag in order to make the potential nearness of impact consistent across different
types of elections that are held at different intervals.
We also include an election-lagged value of the dependent variable to account for potential
serial correlation between election outcomes; this would also capture the average partisanship of
the electorate.10
Other regressors, measured in the same year as the election, Xi,t, include real median house-
hold income in the county, adjusted for inflation, and the share of the population that is black.
RepIncumbi,j is a dummy variable indicating whether the incumbent for election j is a Republi-
can. We also include county employment growth, EmpGrthi,t, as a regressor in order to control
for an obvious factor that might be influencing both Republican vote share and the presence of
unauthorized immigrants. Similarly, to control for possible geographical clustering of the unau-
thorized or network effects, we also include the average size of the unauthorized population in
neighboring counties as a control, NearPerUndoci,t. These two regressors should help control
for potential selection of the unauthorized to locate in particular counties.
10Nickell (1981) warns of bias that arises with the presence of the lagged dependent variable in fixed effects models
with a small number of time periods. We re-estimate the models excluding the lagged dependent variable and the
resulting estimated coefficients on the regressors of interest are essentially the same as those reported here. These and
other robustness checks are available from the authors.
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In addition, both election and county fixed effects (Ej and Ci, respectively) are included to
control for election specific (county invariant) and county specific (time invariant) determinants of
the Republican share of the vote.
If voters view a larger presence of unauthorized immigrants in their county as a potential threat,
turning them toward the Republican party, we would expect a positive estimate of β1. In order to
distinguish between the unauthorized low skilled immigrant threat from more general levels of
possible threats induced by Hispanics, we include both the presence of unauthorized immigrants
(PerUndoc) and the presence of Hispanics (PerHisp) in the same model, effectively holding con-
stant any ethnocentric threat from Hispanics. Since it is estimated that up to 60% of Mexicans and
roughly 47% of Latin American and Caribbean immigrants in the U.S. are unauthorized (see foot-
note 1), we interpret the residual variation in PerUndoc as capturing the influence of the presence
of particularly low-skilled immigrants.
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 2 contains the the marginal effects (see footnote 10) from estimating various specifica-
tions of equation 1 for U.S. Congressional elections. The results in column 1 suggest that there is
little evidence of a prevalent threat effect from the unauthorized. In this model, only the Hispanic
variable is substantively and statistically significant. Such a finding supports previous evidence
that the prevalent fear among the native born is one that is sourced in anti-Hispanic, non-economic
ethnocentric fears.
Once we restrict our attention to those counties that have a higher than median share of unau-
thorized immigrants, however, the prevalent threat effect is no longer the only thing that matters.
When the population size of the unauthorized is substantially large (defined as 0.51%, or the sam-
ple median share), we find that the unauthorized are also positively correlated with Republican
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vote share.11 Furthermore, this reaction to the presence of the unauthorized is substantively as well
as statistically stronger than the threat effect estimated for Hispanics. Our finding gives further cre-
dence to previous evidence that finds substantial changes in the size of immigrant groups over time
captures local attention and that areas respond with an increase in the vote share for the political
party that is tougher on immigration and supports lower taxes.12
The results thus far suggest that voters may respond to actual changes in their communities.
Like previous research we find that their responses are conditional on actual demographic changes
rather than anxieties manifested across all counties (Malhotra, Margalit, and Hyunjung Mo, 2013).
Among all counties, the share of vote going to Republicans increases by 0.6 of a percentage point
for every percentage point increase in the population share of Hispanics. This suggests that there
exists significant underlying cultural prejudice. In addition, as the share of unauthorized immi-
grants reaches and surpasses the median value across all counties (0.51 percent), we find that a
one-percentage point increase in the share of unauthorized immigrants employed by firms in those
counties results in a 1.55 percentage point gain in the Republican share of the vote in the next U.S.
Congressional election – in counties with larger shares of unauthorized, the reaction to a percent-
age point increase in the unauthorized population is larger than to a percentage point increase in
Hispanics. This suggests that in addition to a general feeling of cultural prejudice, voters are also
reacting to a perceived threat to material interests when the share of unauthorized in their county
reaches a certain threshold.
The average share of the Republican vote in Congressional elections varies from over 50 per-
cent through the mid-1990s to roughly 59 percent in the 2000s. Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-
11These results are consistent with Mayda, Peri, and Steingress (2015) who, using state level data, find that higher
shares of non-citizen immigrants decrease Republican share votes when the number of non-citizen immigrants is large.
12We also run these same models in Senatorial and Gubernatorial elections and include them in a supplemental
appendix. We find similar results for Senatorial elections but in Gubernatorial elections, the unauthorized is never a
significant predictor of Republican vote share again supporting recent evidence linking immigration and Republican
vote which is similar to findings in Hajnal and Rivera (2014). Mayda, Peri, and Steingress (2015) also find much
stronger reactions to immigrants in Congressional House elections relative to Gubernatorial, Senatorial, or Presidential
elections.
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Barrera (2013) estimate that the unauthorized population in Georgia increased from 3.1 percent in
2000 to 4.4 percent in 2010 (a 1.3 percentage point increase).13 Based on the estimates in Table 2,
the influx of unauthorized might account for a gain of about two percent of the votes going to the
Republicans for the U.S. Congressional candidate over this time period (1.3 times 1.55) – at least
in counties with the largest shares of unauthorized.
Also in Table 2 we see that the Republican share of the vote is lower in counties with a greater
share of black voters and with lower median household income, which is consistent with findings
in the literature (see for example Gelman, Shor, Bafumi et al. (2007)). As might also be expected,
as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, party
identification is important. In addition, Republican incumbency is positive and significant, indi-
cating a great deal of underlying electoral outcome inertia. The negative coefficient on the lagged
dependent variable could be capturing the overall growth in Republican growth share from the
previous period in most counties.
In order to figure out when such effects are most likely manifested, we also do sub-analysis for
general and midterm elections. We report these findings in columns 3 and 4. While the lack of
power produces results not significant at conventional levels, the results for midterm elections are
nearly seven times larger than those for the general elections, are roughly of the same magnitude
as for the whole sample, and are statistically significant at the 88 percent confidence level, sug-
gesting that it is midterm rather than general elections where the positive correlation is expressed
most. There are a number of reasons for why this may be the case. The limited number of peo-
ple who vote in midterm elections and the composition of voters who vote in midterm elections
may also be those who worry most about an influx of immigrants. In particular, older, white, and
wealthier individuals are more likely to vote in midterm elections and so our results may be captur-
ing these characteristics (Jackson, Brown, and Wright, 1998). This supports survey evidence that
finds that age is positively correlated with anti-immigrant sentiment (Hainmueller and Hangartner,
13Passel, Cohn, and Gonzalez-Barrera (2013)
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2013). Zingher and Steen Thomas (2014) also find that racial diversity might matter for elections.
According to these authors, whites who live in heterogeneous precincts turnout to vote less than
whites in homogeneous precincts, however racial segregation within the precinct matters also. An-
other explanation might be that we are picking up the dissatisfaction with the President’s party and
voters’ greater willingness to vote against the incumbent. One problem with this argument, how-
ever, is that while it could explain a greater shift towards the Republicans during Clinton’s tenure
(1993-2001), it would not explain the shift to the Republicans during Bush’s tenure (2001-2009)
(Abramowitz, Cover, and Norpoth, 1986; Knight, 2014).
The identification of voters responding to a feeling of threat does not alone tell us whether
that threat is related to fiscal concerns. In order to examine this, column 5 of Table 2 interacts
the percent undocumented with median household income (adjusted for inflation). The results
of the marginal effects indicate that increased support for Republicans is more pronounced the
wealthier the county. Figure 4 shows the estimated marginal change in the expected Republican
vote share as median household income in the county increases. We find that Republican vote
share is more responsive to higher shares of unauthorized immigrants in more wealthy counties
than it is in lower income counties. This suggests that opposition to the growing presence of the
unauthorized is not dominated by labor market concerns, as those would expected to be more
pronounced in poorer counties. In addition, Voters in more wealthy counties pay higher taxes,
suggesting that the material interest we see reflected in column 2 is likely based on redistributive
concern. Furthermore, we also see a stronger impact of the unauthorized compared to Hispanics
as before. Also, as median household income and the percent of the population that is black
are somewhat negatively correlated, we are likely capturing wealthy opposition to unauthorized
immigration in higher-income counties comprised of white voters.
Finally, some scholars have found that voters in areas that were historically racist against blacks
are also more likely to vote Republican, especially in the U.S. South. If historical legacy is corre-
lated with modern opposition for immigrants, then voters’ reactions could be reflecting historical
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prejudice rather than current response to unauthorized immigration (Acharya, Blackwell, and Sen,
2016; O’Connell, 2012; Reece and OConnell, 2016). The advantage of being able to use cross
sectional time series data is that we are able to control for historical prejudice, as well as any other
time-invariant correlates, through the inclusions of county fixed-effects. As another check to make
sure that we are not capturing mere persistence in racial attitudes or historical prejudice, we re-
run the analysis using the population percent of blacks in 1860 to weight the county observations.
The effect is to place greater weight on those voters living in areas with higher historical levels
of slavery. We find no practical differences in the results as shown by column 6, suggesting that
persistence in prejudice across generations is not the main driver of our results.
5 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
The results above show that as the share of unauthorized immigrants in a county increases,
the share of votes going to the Republican candidate in the next election also increases, providing
support for explanations of material as well as non-material interests. However, we do not have a
panel of individual vote data over time. Consequently, our results may be driven by voter mobility
motivated by the presence of unauthorized immigrants. In addition, our results don’t prove a link
between opinions about unauthorized immigration and voting behavior. This section details further
analyses designed to address these, and other, potential concerns.
Reverse Causality?
In the estimation, we include lags of the undocumented share in order to prevent against the pos-
sibility of reverse causality. As an additional test of whether it might be the case that the un-
documented are drawn to counties with a higher share of Republicans (and whatever economic
or social benefits that might bestow), we undertook a Granger causality test. Whilst not a test of
“deep causality”, we can use Granger causality measures to test for sequence. The results of the
Granger and VAR test are presented in Table 3. Conducting these tests, we found that three lags
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(6 years) in each variable was sufficient. While we find that the number of undocumented (and
the variables lags) improve the forecast of the county-level Republican vote share (as expected
from the results presented above), we find little evidence that Republican vote share (and its lags)
improve the forecast of the numbers of the undocumented. This provides additional evidence that
the temporal ordering goes from changes in the shares of the unauthorized population to changes
in Republican vote share rather than the converse.
In and Out Migration?
Faced with an increase in the number of unauthorized immigrants, it is possible that Democrats
move out of the county if they experience greater economic threats than Republican voters. As a
result of mobility, then, we might observe higher Republican support in counties with higher shares
of undocumented workers, which would confound our interpretation. It is also feasible that owners
of capital (likely to be Republicans) move into counties with higher numbers of undocumented
workers as they offer a new source of inexpensive labor.
In order to check for the importance of migration, we examine inflow and outflows of indi-
viduals into counties using the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) county-to-county Migration Data.
These data contain residential location information for 95 to 98 percent of the individual income
tax filing population. For each county in Georgia, for each year, we know the number of people
who moved into the county (inflow), the number of people who moved out of the county (outflow),
and the number of people who remained in the county (non-movers). Data are available from 2005
through to 2010.
If out-migration patterns are the mechanism at work behind the marginal effects in Table 2,
then we should observe a positive correlation between the share of undocumented workers in the
previous year and the county’s outflow percentage. Additionally, if owners of capital (Republi-
cans) are moving into counties with higher shares of undocumented workers to take advantage of
economic opportunities, then we should observe a positive correlation between the share of undoc-
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umented workers in the county and the inflow percentage. While this analysis does not identify the
political affiliation of people moving from one county to another, a significant relationship between
the presence of unauthorized immigrants and migration is a necessary condition to conclude that
migration is driving our main results.
Table 4 presents the marginal effects from a logistic regression which allows us to control
for other county characteristics and county and year fixed effects, in addition to the previous year’s
percent of unauthorized immigrants (again, proxied for by average share of undocumented workers
within firms). We observe that the coefficient on lagged undocumented workers is positive in the
outflow equation and negative in the inflow equation, but more importantly neither measure is
statistically or substantively significantly. These results provide further evidence that as the share
of undocumented workers increases, increased support for Republicans is not, at least primarily,
being driven by migration patterns. We do note however, that there are other statistically significant
relationships that appear in this estimation exercise. In-migration is lower to counties with a high
share of blacks and higher in counties with a lower share of the vote going to Republicans in the
previous election. This second results may be picking up growth in urban counties, which are less
likely to vote Republican.
Individual Attitudes?
Another potential problem with making inferences about changing voter behavior from the re-
sults reported here is that the analysis relies on aggregate county level data and therefore cannot
tell us about actual behavioral change linked to opinions; as a result, our analysis might suffer
from ecological inference (King, 1997). One strategy to overcome this shortcoming is to examine
differences in natives’ sentiments towards the unauthorized at the individual level and to compare
these micro-level results with the aggregate results above. The Cooperative Congressional Election
Study (CCES) is a nationally stratified survey administered by YouGov/Polimetrix. In 2012, the
survey asked a series of questions relating to immigration. Important for our purposes, one of the
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questions on immigration was related directly to unauthorized immigrants and respondents’ opin-
ions on restricting access to emergency medical treatment and public schools. In addition to this
question, the survey also asks basic demographic and socio-economic questions including where
the respondent lives, their family income, their gender, education level and whether or not they
were employed. Matched with the same county level measure of unauthorized immigrants used
for the main analysis, we use this survey question to test whether or not respondents’ attitudes for
restricting unauthorized immigrants from accessing publicly funded social services is associated
with actual population share of the unauthorized. As the literature has stressed both macro and mi-
cro level explanations, we evaluate both individual and county level factors that may help predict
restrictive attitudes towards immigration.
The text of the immigration question that we use asks respondents:
What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration?
Prohibit illegal immigrants from using emergency hospital care and public schools.
The dependent variable is coded 1 if someone answers yes and 0 if someone answers no, and
coding the dependent variable this way makes our findings directly comparable with previous
research findings (see for e.g. Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter, 2007; Tingley, 2013). However, this
survey is unique in that it asks directly about illegal immigrants, rather than about immigrants in
general.14 The sample of respondents that we use match the previous analysis and are individuals
that reside in the state of Georgia. We match respondents with our county level data by county
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) code. The total number of unique respondents
in the sample is 1789. Out of this number, 1209 respondents (approximately 68 percent) report
that they do not support restricting emergency hospital care and public schools. The remaining
550 respondents (approximately 32 percent), meanwhile, report that they do support restricting
14 Unfortunately the CCES does not ask the same question in different waves and therefore a repeated cross-section
design is not possible. Other surveys such as the ANES, while repeated, unfortunately do not ask about the relationship
between illegal immigrants and restricting social services.
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social services to illegal immigrants. Georgia voters are not unique and hold views consistent with
broader opinions about immigrants and welfare spending in the U.S. electorate. For example, in
the 2008 American National Election Survey (ANES), 30 percent of respondents across the U.S.
were concerned about Latino immigrants and their use of welfare services.15
Using the answer for this question as a measure of fiscal concerns triggered by the presence of
unauthorized immigrants, we estimate a series of logit models to test individual and county level
characteristics. In order to make sure that survey respondents are responding to the survey ques-
tion that should raise feelings of immigrant-specific threats and not that we are tapping into mere
correlation with other unaccounted-for attitudes, we run the same model on a number of other
questions from the same survey. In other words, our results on unauthorized immigration may
just be picking up the degree of respondent political “conservatism” which is unrelated to unau-
thorized immigrants and conservative respondents may happen to live proximate to unauthorized
immigrants. In order to rule this out, we estimate exactly the same model but change the depen-
dent variable from opposition to illegal immigrants using social services to whether respondents
oppose gay marriage, oppose gun control, and oppose spending on Medicaid and Medicare. If our
estimation is merely picking up general level partisan and fiscal conservatism, independent from
the survey question, then we should see roughly the same results as for the unauthorized.
Our results are reported in Table 5. We find that counties with higher numbers of unauthorized
immigrants, conditional on their income, are more likely to support restricting social services to
illegal immigrants.16 This finding further supports our previous evidence; there is clearly higher
opposition to immigration in those counties where the population share of the unauthorized is
15Tingley (See Table 2, 2013)
16We try two different measures of this conditional effect, counties with an above 1 standard deviation from the
mean share of unauthorized and counties with an above median share are coded 1 and 0 otherwise. The results are
significant only in the first specification and not the second. One explanation for the differences in thresholds when
compared with the voting analysis may be that respondents are more likely to respond to social desirability bias
in answering surveys making them less likely to speak out about unauthorized immigration. See Hainmueller and
Hangartner (2013) for a discussion.
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higher. We also find that higher income individuals are more in favor of restricting spending
on social programs available to the unauthorized where the numbers of the unauthorized in their
county are high. Furthermore, we find that this is true even when we control for the Hispanic
share of the population. This evidence continues to offer support that there is a positive association
between a greater presence of unauthorized immigrants and more restrictive attitudes towards fiscal
services. Additionally, we also find that this result persists even when we include a measure for
partisanship, controlling for those respondents who self identify as Republicans. This suggests that
our results hold broadly for other respondents, such as Independents, Democrats and undecided
respondents. We also account for whether or not respondents might be concerned about “law
breaking” by including a measure of respondents’ willingness to use U.S. military troops to uphold
international law. Our results still hold.
Finally, we also account for whether or not the individual respondent has a job or not. We
find that while employment status is not a predictor of whether or not someone wants to restrict
the unauthorized from using social services, it is a predictor of whether or not someone supports
spending on Medicaid and Medicare. This provides further evidence that employment changes,
such as losing one’s job, are statistically related to holding more protectionist views on fiscal policy
rather than anti-immigrant views induced by labor market competition. Like our results reported
above that analyze voting behavior, we find no evidence that lower income individuals hold more
anti-immigrant sentiments and that it is the wealthier rather than the poor that are more likely to
express anti-immigrant sentiments sourced in economic concerns.17
17We also examine the affect of the share of unauthorized immigrants on Republican voter intent and also Republi-
can voter recall and present these results in Table A.2 in the Appendix. The findings support the original specification,
however, the interaction is no longer statistically significant, likely due to a reduction in the number of observations
available for computation. For example, even the Republican party ID variable, which is the most robust predictor
of Republican voting behavior, is no longer a significant predictor of Republican voter intent, despite the positive
correlation between Republican party ID and Republican voter intent. There are also some well known methodolog-
ical problems with the voter intent and voter recollection variables. For voter intent, over one-third of respondents
answered the question about how they would vote in the upcoming election as ”Don’t know.” This makes statistical
analysis difficult as a large share of the survey respondents have missing data. Secondly, with the vote recollection
question, its well understood that vote recall data can suffer both from over-representation of actual voters among
survey respondents and also vote over-reporting by actual nonvoters (Sciarini and Goldberg, 2016).
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In summary, we theorize that one channel through which a larger presence of unauthorized
immigrants produces stronger support for the Republican party in the U.S. is due to a fear that
growing income inequality will lead to efforts for greater degrees of redistribution (i.e., through
higher tax rates on the wealthy). We see in Table 2 that wealthier counties react more strongly to
larger numbers of unauthorized, providing some evidence that redistributive threats are at work.
Using survey data for 2012, we also find that those with higher incomes are more likely to oppose
the unauthorized using social services when respondents live in counties with high number of the
unauthorized. While researchers have been quick to point out a lack of a statistical relationship
between the number of immigrants and higher tax contributions as evidence against the fiscal
burden hypothesis, we find instead that, conditional on the unauthorized being present, wealthier
rather than poorer voters are more likely to shift their allegiance to the right.
6 CONCLUSION
Due to a lack of data, no empirical study has been able to examine whether voters respond
to an influx of low skilled unauthorized immigration with greater appetites for protection in the
United States over time while holding other concerns, such as racial prejudice against Hispanics,
constant.18 We find a significant positive correlation between larger shares of unauthorized im-
migration and electoral support for Republicans in counties with at least the sample median share
of unauthorized. This is in addition to general voter opposition to Hispanics–the ethnic group to
which the majority of unauthorized immigrants in the U.S. belong. Furthermore, we find this re-
sponse to be greater in richer counties, supporting a theory of redistributive fears as the mechanism
driving the results.
We also provide evidence that the results are not being driven by composition bias of voters
18One analysis that comes close is Mayda, Peri, and Steingress (2015) who use state-level data to assess the impact
of immigration generally on support for Democrats and Republicans.
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in the county, as the presence of the unauthorized is not statistically related to migration patterns.
Similarly, we also examine whether or not historical prejudice as opposed to contemporary patterns
of prejudice may be driving the results. Finally, we test whether or not our results are consistent
with evidence at the individual level. As in the cross sectional time series analysis, we find that
it is richer individuals who are more likely to respond negatively toward the unauthorized, while
accounting for whether or not such opposition is based on concerns such as party affiliation, up-
holding the rule of law, or employment status.
Our research design has a number of important features and our results help build further
support for theories of material interest alongside theories of racial and ethnic prejudice, which,
according to our results, also matter. First, we are able to make use of unique administrative data
that allows us to link a greater presence of unauthorized immigrants with changes in elections.
Second, by examining county elections within a state, we are able to control for many of the
institutional features that make cross-country or cross-state comparisons difficult and comparative
analysis too blunt. Third, we know from previous work that the link between individual income
and voting is particularly strong in the South and so an analysis using Georgia data is particularly
well suited (Gelman, Shor, Bafumi et al., 2007). Fourth, because we are examining the effects of a
non-voting population, we need not be concerned about the behavior of the population of interest
confounding the results. Finally, by exploiting a long time series, we can characterize the pattern
of the relationship over time.
As far as implications of the results in this paper beyond the borders of Georgia, given Geor-
gia’s prominence and similarity to other states in the South, our results should be generalizable to
other states with similar dynamics. Of course, unauthorized immigration is only one issue voters
consider when heading to the polls. If other issues loom larger for voters, especially if the popula-
tion share of unauthorized immigrants is relatively small, the impact of unauthorized immigration
on voters’ behavior may be diluted. However, the issue of immigration does not seem to be going
away. Immigration has become a defining issue in U.S. Republican politics, as it has for politicians
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in Germany, Switzerland, and Australia, just to name a few. Immigration touches on a number of
central issues: nationalism, economics, culture, and national security. Our findings help shed light
on growing tensions in many countries that have aging populations and growing income inequal-
ity. On the one hand, countries with aging populations and growing income inequality may need to
increase immigration to sustain generous welfare spending such as health and retirement benefits.
On the other hand, natives, and especially wealthy voters, may react to an influx of immigrants
with higher appetites for protectionism.
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Table 1: Average annual growth, 1994-2008, in U.S. and GA employment, Hispanic workers, and
workers identified as undocumented.
Average Annual
Growth Rate of:
Total number of workers in the U.S 1.43%
Total number of foreign born, Hispanic workers in the U.S. 7.26%
Total number of workers in Georgia 2.82%
Total number of foreign born, Hispanic workers in Georgia 20.74%
Total number of workers in GA identified as undocumented 29.65%
Note: Average annual growth, 1994-2008, in U.S. and GA employment, His-
panic workers, and workers identified as undocumented. Current Population
Survey, Basic Survey (March), 1994-2008; and authors’ calculations. 1994 is
used as the base year since it is the first year the Current Population Survey has
a reliable indicator of Hispanic ethnicity.
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Table 3: Granger Causality Test
Dependent Variable Percent Undocumented Percent Republican Votes
PercentUndocumentedt−1 0.830*** 0.015*
(-0.071) (-0.008)
PercentUndocumentedt−2 0.015 -0.004
(-0.101) (-0.010)
PercentUndocumentedt−3 0.172 -0.016**
(-0.124) (-0.008)
ShareRepublicanV otest−1 0.000 0.001***
(-0.000) (-0.000)
ShareRepublicanV otest−2 0.000 0.001***
(-0.001) (-0.000)
ShareRepublicanV otest−3 -0.000 0.000**
(-0.001) (-0.000)
PercentBlack(0− 1) -0.215*** -0.567***
(-0.082) (-0.032)
Constant 0.254*** 0.593***
-0.073 -0.027
Observations 1,272 1,272
R-squared 0.841 0.369
F-stat lagged Republican votes zero 0.125
p-value lagged Republican votes zero 0.945
F-stat lagged percent undocumented zero 2.374
p-value lagged percent undocumented zero 0.069
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Unit of observation is
the county. ∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 statistically different
from zero at the 90th, 95th, and 99th percent confidence levels.
3
Table 4: GLM Logistic Regression of Migration, Congressional Elections 2005-2010
Dependent Variable Out-migration In-migration
Lagged Percent Undoc 0.169 -0.210
(0.229) (0.270)
MedianHH 0.089** 0.072
Income($00000) (0.043) (0.090)
Percent Black (0− 1) -0.353** -0.819***
(0.136) (0.247)
Annual empl growth 0.102 0.048
in county (0− 1) (0.143) (0.239)
Near county 0.146 0.440
simple average (0.385) (0.653)
percent undoc
Lagged Share -0.008 -0.042***
of V otes Going (0.005) (0.008)
to Republicans (0− 1)
Lagged outflow percent -0.679***
(0.216)
Lagged inflow percent 0.147
(0.273)
Observations 795 795
Note: Table contains estimated marginal effects and their robust stan-
dard errors in parentheses. Direct parameter estimates available upon
request.∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05 statistically different
from zero at the 90th, 95th, and 99th percent confidence levels. De-
pendent variable is the percent of population in county that out or
in migrated. Unit of observation is the county. Regressions include
county and year fixed effects.
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Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Logit Estimation of Restrictions to Immigration with Unauthorized-
Income Interaction
Dependent variable = Opposed to:
Social Services Gay Gun Spending on
for Illegals Marriage Control Medicaid and Medicare
Male (0,1) 0.244∗∗ 1.228∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗∗
(0.121) (0.165) (0.122) (0.145)
Highschool (0,1) −0.046 −0.311∗ −0.202 0.583∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.183) (0.144) (0.167)
SomeCollege (0,1) 0.267∗ −0.471∗∗ 0.227 −0.226
(0.154) (0.210) (0.156) (0.204)
CollegeGrad (0,1) 0.906∗∗ 0.096 0.609 −0.309
(0.436) (0.549) (0.481) (0.645)
Republican (0,1) 0.946∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 1.559∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗
(0.127) (0.159) (0.144) (0.150)
InternationalLaw (0,1) −0.485∗∗∗ −1.119∗∗∗ −0.593∗∗∗ −0.951∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.204) (0.126) (0.175)
Employed (0,1) 0.003 0.013 −0.238∗ 0.421∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.166) (0.130) (0.149)
Income (0:7) 0.024 −0.003 0.021 0.011
(0.024) (0.032) (0.024) (0.029)
Undoc ≥ 3% (0-1) −1.637 −0.030 0.330 0.154
(1.174) (1.194) (1.007) (1.142)
Percent Hispanic (0-1) −0.017 0.007 −0.021∗∗ 0.018
(0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012)
Undoc ≥ 3%* Income 0.453∗∗ 0.122 0.035 0.075
(0.214) (0.216) (0.187) (0.206)
Constant −0.975∗∗∗ −2.218∗∗∗ −0.116 −2.223∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.265) (0.192) (0.249)
Observations 1,343 1,341 1,334 1,308
Log Likelihood −810.321 −525.977 −804.439 −604.279
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,644.642 1,075.954 1,632.878 1,232.559
Note: Baseline Education is <High School ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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(a) Counties with percent of population identified
as undocumented
(b) Percent of the Republican vote share across coun-
ties
Figure 1: Distribution of average share of identified undocumented workers across counties and
Republican vote share across counties in the U.S. state of Georgia in 2010.
6
(a) Growth in Cumulative ESF and the number
of GA workers identified as undocumented
(b) Remittance transactions to Mexico and number
of GA workers identified as undocumented.
Figure 2: Source: Huse (2002) for estimates 1990-2000, Johnson (2007) for estimates 2001-2004,
and authors calculations. Dollar estimates reflect 2006 values, using the PCE chain-weighted
deflator. Remittance transactions from Central Bank of Mexico, remittance database.
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(a) County median household income
(thousands of U.S. dollars)
(b) County population share of blacks
(percentage)
Figure 3: Median Household Income and Population Share of Blacks in Georgia 2010 (ρ = -0.41).
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Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Income and the Unauthorized on Republican Vote Share
9
A Appendix
Table A.1: Impact on Republican vote share, PerUndoc ≥ 0.51 for all Elections
Variables Congressional Senatorial Gubernatorial
Elections Elections Elections
Percent 2.475*** 0.866*** 0.449
Undoc (0− 1)t−2 (0.697) (0.251) (0.326)
Median HH Income -0.482* 0.078 0.136
(0.286) (0.068) (0.130)
Percent Undocumented 13.510* 4.903** 6.335**
interacted with (7.010) (1.883) (3.041)
Median HH Income
Percent 0.686* 0.0547 0.266**
Hispanic (0− 1)t−2 (0.349) (0.094) (0.120)
Percent Black (0− 1) -1.036*** -0.474*** -0.902***
(0.250) (0.060) (0.099)
Republican 0.039** 0.073*** 0.070***
Incumbent (0,1) (0.019) (0.007) (0.014)
Annual empl growth 3.364 0.798 3.120***
incounty (0− 1) (3.217) (0.643) (1.069)
Near county 1.805 0.820 -0.274
simple average (2.148) (0.514) (0.897)
percent undocumented
Lagged Dep -0.117*** 0.420*** -0.143**
Variable (0.029) (0.036) (0.061)
Observations 870 621 464
Note: Table contains estimated marginal effects and their robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Direct parameter estimates available upon request. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05,
∗p < 0.1 statistically different from zero at the 90th, 95th, and 99th percent confidence
levels. Dependent variable is the percent of the vote going to Republicans. Unit of obser-
vation is the county. Regressions include county and year fixed effects. General elections
occur in years when there is a presidential election.
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Table A.2: Impact of Undocumented Workers on Republican Vote Intent and Vote Recall
Dependent variable:
Republican Intent Republican Recall Opposed Immigration
(1) (2) (3)
Male (0,1) 0.058 0.086 0.244∗∗
(0.142) (0.147) (0.121)
Highschool (0,1) 0.044 0.105 −0.046
(0.166) (0.174) (0.145)
SomeCollege (0,1) −0.075 0.058 0.267∗
(0.180) (0.187) (0.154)
CollegeGraduate (0,1) −0.492 0.287 0.906∗∗
(0.560) (0.630) (0.436)
Republican (0,1) 0.262 0.358∗∗ 0.946∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.164) (0.127)
InternationalLaw (0,1) −0.167 −0.030 −0.485∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.156) (0.132)
Employed (0,1) −0.033 −0.136 0.003
(0.151) (0.155) (0.129)
Income (0:7) −0.019 −0.037 0.024
(0.028) (0.029) (0.024)
Undoc≥ 3% (0,1) −0.489 −1.293 −1.637
(1.055) (1.391) (1.174)
PercentHispanic (0-1) −0.014 −0.002 −0.017
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011)
Undoc≥ 3%*Income 0.056 0.255 0.453∗∗
(0.208) (0.262) (0.214)
Constant 0.294 0.412∗ −0.975∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.239) (0.196)
Observations 838 796 1,343
Log Likelihood −576.122 −533.932 −810.321
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,176.244 1,091.863 1,644.642
Note: Baseline Education is < High School.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
2
Table A.3: Relationship between Long-term Inequality and Unauthorized Immigration
(1) (2)
GDPt−1 State Welfaret−1
Dependent Variable: Inequality (Gini Coefficient)
Percent undocumented workerst−1 1.942* 2.015*
(0.950) (1.046)
Growth rate of real per capita incomet -0.195
(0.166)
State level public welfare spending, as % of Gross State Productt 0.818
(1.085)
Constant 0.378*** 0.358***
(0.008) (0.020)
Observations 19 19
R-squared 0.384 0.354
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
OLS regression for the state of Georgia, annual data, 1990 to 2011.
Dependent variable is State-level inequality (Gini) based on family income.
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